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Designing Antitrust Agencies for More Effective
Outcomes: What Antitrust Can Learn from
Restaurant Guides
D. Daniel Sokol*
I. CREATING A RESTAURANT GUIDE SURVEY MODEL FOR MEASURING
ANTITRUST EFFECTIVENESS
When you have to go to a city with which you are unfamiliar and you
want to find a good place to eat, you look for information on restaurants
in Zagat, Michelin, or some other food guide.' The recommendations
may not be exactly right, as taste is at some level idiosyncratic.
2
However, generally a survey recommendation provides a good overall
sense of a restaurant's quality. It also provides a relative sense of how
the restaurant compares to others of the same type of cuisine, whether it
has a good wine list or is among the most romantic locations for a
dinner date, and so forth.
Restaurant reviews and "best of' lists must be approached cautiously.
There are many biases at play. Selection bias might distort the analysis,
as it may create a non-random sample. 3 Cognitive biases can skew the
reliability of information. 4 Sometimes such biases are partially due to
too much information and choice. 5 How helpful is it if we hear from a
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin College of Law. Thanks to Russ
Damtoft, Jeff Harrison, Tim Hughes, David Hyman, Michal Gal, Bob Lande, Russ Pitman, and
Maurice Stucke for their suggestions.
1. This issue is particularly salient given the decline of expert restaurant reviewers, the rise of
survey-based evaluations, and on-line individual evaluations that can be aggregated.
2. The Romans, who knew something about good food, used the expression De gustibus non
est disputandum (There is no disputing about tastes).
3. See e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcending
Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1124, 1128-33 (1992) (providing a discussion of issues of
selection bias).
4. Richard H. Thaler, Mental Accounting and Consumer Choice, 4 MARKETING SCI. 199
(1985) (explaining consumer behavior through transaction utility), reprinted in RICHARD H.
THALER, QUASI RATIONAL ECONOMICS 25, 33-37 (1st paperback ed. 1994).
5. WAYNE D. HOYER & DEBORAH J. MACINNIS, CONSUMER BEHAVIOR 115 (Houghton
Mifflin 3d ed. 2004); PHILIP KOTLER & KEVIN LANE KELLER, MARKETING MANAGEMENT 186
(Prentice Hall 12th ed. 2006).
. Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
friend or review that a restaurant's food and service was spotty? Maybe
the chef had a bad day, but the restaurant is otherwise very good. A
survey allows us to aggregate responses and overcome some biases.
Yet, some restaurant surveys may create a bandwagon effect in which
we might believe something because others do or skew how we process
information because only those with strong opinions may respond to a
survey. Given these trade-offs, we are still probably better off in a
world with restaurant guides than one without them because such guides
reduce the search and planning costs of going out for a meal.
Why bring up restaurants in a symposium about antitrust institutions?
For one, a symposium at Loyola University Chicago School of Law
allows me to highlight that Chicago is a great restaurant city at all price
ranges.6  Second, antitrust has a long history of food-related
enforcement. 7 Compelling as these reasons are, I want to focus instead
on antitrust institutions and the idea of creating a Zagat-style guide to
antitrust agencies. A significant issue in antitrust is in how effective the
system is. However, we lack effective measurements oftentimes to
determine the relative strengths and weaknesses of antitrust and its
institutions.
Antitrust policy should be concerned with the quality and
effectiveness of the antitrust system. Some efforts at agency
effectiveness include self-study of antitrust agencies to determine the
factors that lead to improving agency quality.8 Such studies, however,
6. Donald Burnam, America's Best Restaurant Cities 2007, FORBESTRAVELER.COM, Apr. 17,
2007, http://staging.forbestraveler.com/food-drink/restaurant-cities-story.html.
You'd think that Chicago's Midwestern swagger would make it a meat-and-potatoes
town, but as America's most majestic, wide-open, best-designed city, it's also central
to American gastronomy, from innovations like the salad bar at R.J. Grunt's and hip
tapas bars like Caf6 Ba-Ba-Reeba! to some of the best Mexican food in the U.S. at
Topolobampo and Frontera Grill. It's a lot more fun to eat out in Chi-town than almost
anywhere else.
Id.; Alan Richman, 2nd City No More, GQ, June 2006, available at http://www.gq.com/food-
travel/alan-richman/200605/chicago-second-city.
7. For some recent cases see, e.g., FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 548 F.3d 1028 (D.C. Cir.
2008); FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708 (D.C. Cir. 2001); FTC v. Hicks, Muse, Tate & Furst
Equity Fund V, L.P., No. 1:02-cv-02070-RWR (D.D.C. dismissed Oct. 31, 2002); Nestl6
Holdings, Inc., 136 F.T.C. 791 (2003) (consent order). Food systems issues also are ones in
which monopsony may play an important role. See generally ROGER BLAIR & JEFFREY
HARRISON, THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF MONOPSONY (forthcoming 2010) (explaining the
importance of monopsony issues in antitrust analysis).
8. E.g., William E. Kovacic, Rating the Competition Agencies: What Constitutes Good
Performance?, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 903 (2009) [hereinafter Rating the Competition
Agencies] (advocating a normative criteria for standards of antitrust agencies); William E.
Kovacic, Using Ex Post Evaluations to Improve the Performance of Competition Policy
Authorities, 31 J. CORP. L. 503 (2006) [hereinafter Using Ex Post Evaluations] (suggesting ex
post evaluation in making competition policy).
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often focus only on enforcement decisions and other agency initiatives
such as competition advocacy. They do not reflect at least one other
part of the equation:9 what do non-government users of the antitrust
system think about the quality of antitrust agencies?
What if we created a yearly survey of antitrust agencies around the
world from the consumer perspective? Law school graduates in the
United States are well aware of the importance of rankings because of
the U.S. News rankings that rate law schools.10 One result is that the
U.S. News rankings take away some of a school's ability to control its
reputation. I I
I propose that an antitrust agency rating focus on quality, which is a
reputational ranking. Quality has more to do with perception. An
agency cannot easily buy a better rating the way a law school can by
increasing its students' median LSAT score by two points. Restaurants
understand that if the quality (or at least the perception of the quality) of
their food and service decline, so will business. If antitrust agencies
want to improve their ratings, they can improve the quality of their
service (procedural issues and transparency) as well as the quality of
their food (substantive decision-making).
Do the consumers of the antitrust system understand quality the way
that consumers at a restaurant do? People might have different notions
of quality at a restaurant. I love anchovies on pizza; my wife does not.
Nevertheless, that does not mean that she cannot appreciate the
difference between a good pizza that has anchovies and a bad one.
Something analogous occurs in antitrust. Consumers of the antitrust
system, such as antitrust lawyers, think that a well-reasoned decision is
one that supports their client's position. Yet, these lawyers also accept
that antitrust decision-making for clients is based on a risk-reward
system and that greater antitrust risk may lead to an adverse
enforcement outcome. A high-risk decision that comes out unfavorably
9. Rating the Competition Agencies, supra note 8, at 903 (suggesting a number of different
issues that need to be factored into such an analysis).
10. Alfred L. Brophy, The Relationship Between Law Review Citations and Law School
Reputation, 39 CONN. L. REV. 43, 50 (2006); Paul L. Caron & Rafael Gely, What Law Schools
Can Learn from Billy Beane and the Oakland Athletics, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1483 (2004); Russell
Korobkin, In Praise of Law School Rankings: Solutions to Coordination and Collective Action
Problems, 77 TEX. L. REV. 403 (1998); Nancy B. Rapoport, Ratings, Not Rankings: Why U.S.
News & World Report Shouldn't Want to Be Compared to Time and Newsweek-or The New
Yorker, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1097 (1999).
11. Michael Sauder & Wendy Nelson Espeland, Strength in Numbers? The Advantages of
Multiple Rankings, 81 IND. L.J. 205 (2006). Because of the various weights given to various
subjective and objective factors, it is possible to game the U.S. News system. Plus, playing to the
rule is at least, in part, the point.
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but is well reasoned is better for predictability of the antitrust decision,
future business counseling, and litigation strategy than a favorable
decision that is poorly reasoned. On some level, good lawyers accept
that decisions might not go their way but respect a system that provides
for well-reasoned decision-making. 12
With both food and antitrust, there are two types of
consumers-locals and those who have comparative perspective. When
I started law school at the University of Chicago, I was directed by the
locals to eat at Giordano's and Gino's East because they were regarded
as the two "best" pizza places in Chicago. Because I had not grown up
in the Midwest, I was unfamiliar with the Chicago version of pizza. For
those not acquainted with Chicago deep-dish pizza, it is best described
as a pizza casserole. Deep-dish pizza is quite heavy and bakes for so
long that the cheese cannot be placed on top of the pizza or it would
bum. Chicago deep-dish may be many things but to non-locals it is not
pizza. Real pizza is thin crust that comes out crispy from the oven. The
tip of a good thin crust pizza slice should not fall under the weight of
too much cheese. 13 People might differ as to what constitutes superior
toppings or the advantages of a wood versus gas oven, but a slice of
pizza should not be heavier than the Areeda and Hovenkamp multi-
volume antitrust treatise. 14
Similarly, a rating system for antitrust agencies that relies only on
what local lawyers think about an agency may lead to mistaken
inferences. Local lawyers might have their own sense of what
constitutes high quality merger analysis. Such a view, however, may be
quite different from practitioners from other jurisdictions.
In favor of local opinion is that local practitioners may be repeat
players and the ones most familiar with the local antitrust system and
therefore the best to judge its quality. 15 Yet, foreign lawyers have a
12. Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 188 (2004).
13. If you don't believe me, believe Alton Brown of the Food Network and Bon App6tit
Magazine. Food Network, Top American Restaurants: Bon Appetit Picks the Best,
http://www.foodnetwork.com/food-network-specials/top-american-restaurants-bon-appetit-picks-
the-best/index.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2010) (choosing only thin crust pizzas as the best pizzas
in America).
14. I will not even get into calorie counts between deep-dish and thin slice. Actually, I will.
One slice of Giordano's deep-dish pepperoni pizza has 800 calories with 25 grams of total fat.
One slice is almost half of a person's daily caloric intake. My Fitness Pal, Calories in Giordano's
Pizza Stuffed Pizza: Pepperoni Pizza, http://www.myfitnesspal.com/food/calories/giordanos-
pizza-stuffed-pizza-pepperoni-pizza-945895 (last visited Feb. 7, 2010).
15. One measurement that could be used would be a comparative local ranking-how does
antitrust regulation perform relative to banking regulation, telecom regulation, securities
regulation, etc. This would allow locals to weigh the relative success of the antitrust system.
However, if local practitioners have thoughts about multiple regulators, this would suggest that
[Vol. 41
2010] Designing Antitrust Agencies for More Effective Outcomes 577
better comparative perspective of the quality of a given antitrust system
and can compare the relative quality of one agency to another.
At the practical level, it is not clear how much useful cross-
comparative information will emerge. As a restaurant patron, I can go
into restaurants worldwide and apply comparable standards. But who
actually walks into multiple competition agencies and deals with their
respective staffs? I suspect that in the case of the National Institute for
the Defense of Competition and the Protection of Intellectual Property
(INDECOPI), it is primarily Peruvian lawyers. In the case of the
Federal Antimonopoly Service (FAS), it is Russian lawyers. Even in
most multinational mergers, it is the retained local counsel who
undertake most of the interaction with the agencies. Local counsel,
therefore, may filter their agency interaction in a way that does not
provide in-house counsel or other outside counsel a true sense of the
pros and cons of a particular agency and antitrust system.
There is a trade-off between local knowledge and comparative
perspective. In the absence of agreed standards, there may be multiple
"optimal" approaches. For this reason, it is important to poll the
opinions of both sets of lawyers and to disaggregate results between
locals and non-locals. 16
Do we at least agree as to the basic elements of what constitutes a
pizza or, for that matter, antitrust enforcement? We have a sense overall
of the contours of merger control and cartel enforcement from
international best practices from the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) and the International Competition
Network (ICN). 17 As to the specific practices of antitrust law and
policy, these will vary from country to country but should be within the
range of accepted international practices. 18 There is not a clear sense of
what best practices are in a number of substantive areas of antitrust,
they are not repeat players before the antitrust agency and their opinion may be skewed by outlier
experiences.
16. Of course, it is also crucial to keep the identity of survey respondents confidential.
17. Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev. (OECD), Recommendation of the Council
Concerning Effective Action Against Hard Core Cartels, OECD Doc. C(98)35/Final (Mar. 25,
1998); OECD, Recommendation of the Council on Merger Review, OECD Doc. C(2005)34 (Mar.
23, 2005); OECD, OECD Competition Comm., Best Practices for the Formal Exchange of
Information Between Competition Authorities in Hard Core Cartel Investigations (Oct. 2, 2005);
First Annual Conference of the Int'l Competition Network (ICN), Notification & Procedures
Subgroup, Naples, Italy, Sept. 28-29, 2002, Guiding Principles for Merger Notification and
Review Procedures; Fifth Annual Conference of the ICN, Cape Town, S. Afr., May 3-5, 2006,
Recommended Practices for Merger Notification and Review Procedures.
18. D. Daniel Sokol, The Future of International Antitrust and Improving Antitrust Agency
Capacity, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 1081 (2009) [hereinafter Sokol, International Antitrust].
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particularly in the area of single firm conduct. 19
Il. WHAT WOULD THE SURVEY INCLUDE?
What then should we use to rank antitrust agencies? I believe that the
ranking should be based on consumers' personal experience in the last
year regarding the following issues ranked from one (lowest score) to
five (highest score):20
1. How do you rate the transparency of the antitrust agency in its
decision-making process?
This question gets to the issue of how transparency aids in business
planning.21 In a restaurant, you want to know the hours of operation of
the restaurant as well as issues like the chef's use of butter or spices.
With antitrust agencies, firms want to understand the enforcement
priorities of the agency and issues such as the determinants for why
agencies decide to undertake or not undertake enforcement decisions.
Transparency includes enforcement standards and procedures and the
broader issue of the decision-making framework of the agency on
various substantive antitrust issues.22  Transparency also includes
agencies releasing studies in which agency staff use confidential
information to undertake meta-analysis of how certain kinds of claims
and situations play out in case analysis before the agency, even if it does
not result in a decision. 23
Of course, there are certain costs and benefits to transparency.
Increased transparency taxes resources. However, the potential benefits
in increased transparency for an agency include greater predictability
19. David S. Evans, Why Different Jurisdictions Do Not (and Should Not) Adopt the Same
Antitrust Rules, 10 CHI. J. INT'L L. 161 (2009); Damien Geradin, The Perils of Antitrust
Proliferation: The Globalization of Antitrust and the Risks of Overregulation of Competitive
Behavior, 10 CHI. J. INT'L L. 189 (2009); William H. Page, Mandatory Contracting Remedies in
the American and European Microsoft Cases, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 787 (2008); Mats A. Bergman
et al., Atlantic Divide or Gulf Stream Convergence: Merger Policies in the European Union and
the United States, (July 1, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssm.com/
abstract=975102.
20. Along with a box for "not applicable."
21. See generally Warren S. Grimes, Transparency in Federal Antitrust Enforcement, 51
BUFF. L. REV. 937 (2003) (offering thoughts on transparency in merger enforcement).
22. John M. Nannes, Transparency in Federal Antitrust Enforcement Decisions: A Reaction to
Professor Grimes, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 1017, 1017-18 (2003).
23. Malcolm B. Coate, Theory Meets Practice: Barriers to Entry in Merger Analysis (Feb. 18,
2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract--988423; Malcolm B.
Coate, Alive and Kicking: Collusion Theories in Merger Analysis at the Federal Trade
Commission (Jan. 1, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssm.com/
abstract=1030067.
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and accountability for the agency and better planning by the non-agency
users of antitrust in a given country. These seem to outweigh the costs.
2. How do you rate the level of expediency of issues before the agency?
Time is money. A lack of business certainty has negative effects
upon firms. Yet, there have to be trade-offs regarding expediency. A
quick "wrong" decision is not better than a slow "right" decision.
3. How do you rate the procedural fairness of the antitrust system?
Procedural fairness should be an important bedrock not just of
antitrust but of the entire legal system. 2
4
4. How do you rate the quality of the judiciary's ability to understand
antitrust issues?
The judiciary plays an important role in antitrust because it can
uphold or strike down a determination of wrongdoing made by an
agency. If the judiciary does a poor job in understanding the economic
basis for antitrust, decision-making may be highly variable.25 It also
matters if the judiciary is climbing a learning curve as opposed to being
persistently bad in its decision-making.
5. How do you rate the quality of the staff of the antitrust agency?
An antitrust agency is only as good as the quality of the staff of the
agency. 26 If case handlers cannot distinguish a good case from a bad
one, antitrust will become an arbitrary regulatory tax on doing business
within a given jurisdiction.
6. How do you rate the quality of the leadership of the antitrust agency?
Are the managers doing a good job? Management of the antitrust
agency is responsible for the strategic vision of the agency, such as
24. Joel Brockner et al., Cultural and Procedural Justice: The Influence of Power Distance
on Reactions to Voice, 37 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 300, 301 (2001); Larry Heuer et al.,
The Role of Societal Benefits and Fairness Concerns Among Decision Makers and Decision
Recipients, 31 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 573, 574 (2007); Solum, supra note 12, at 188; A. Benjamin
Spencer, Understanding Pleading Doctrine, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1, 23-24 (2009); Diane P.
Wood, Antitrust at the Global Level, 72 U. CHI. L. REv. 309, 315 (2005).
25. D. Daniel Sokol, Limiting Anti-Competitive Government Interventions that Benefit Special
Interests, 17 GEo. MASON L. REv. 117, 145 (2009); Michael R. Baye & Joshua D. Wright, Is
Antitrust Too Complicated for Generalist Judges? The Impact of Economic Complexity &
Judicial Training on Appeals 6 (Geo. Mason L. & Econ. Research Paper Series, Research Paper
No. 09-07, 2009), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id= 1319888.
26. Sokol, International Antitrust, supra note 18, at 1082-83; D. Daniel Sokol & Kyle W.
Stiegert, Exporting Knowledge Through Technical Assistance and Capability Building, 5 J.
COMPETION L. & EcON. (forthcoming 2010).
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setting the enforcement and non-enforcement priorities. This is distinct
from agency staff that has a more technical (and tactical) role in the
implementation of the law and policy.
The next group of questions goes to the quality of substantive
analysis in antitrust analysis.
7. How do you rate the overall quality of merger review?
Quality in mergers has both procedural/timing issues and substantive
issues. It may be that a merger regime is good on process but bad on
analysis and vice versa. It is possible to isolate each element by
breaking up the question into additional sub-questions.
7a. How do you rate the quality of the merger review process?
7b. How do you rate the quality of substantive merger review?
8. How do you rate the quality of cartel enforcement?
Some of the effectiveness of cartel enforcement may be a function of
what the legal system provides. Does the law allow for a leniency
program? Does the antitrust law provide for criminal sanctions for
individuals? Are civil penalties sufficient for optimal deterrence? 27
These institutional factors will shape the quality of antitrust as much as
the abilities of the agency staff and leadership.
9. How do you rate the workability of the legal standards under rule of
law principles?
The rule of law means many things to many people. 8 Maurice
Stucke has expressed concern that the rule of reason in antitrust may
27. John M. Connor, Latin America and the Control of International Cartels, in COMPETITION
LAW AND POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA (Eleanor M. Fox and D. Daniel Sokol eds., 2009)
(suggesting that global fines are not high enough for optimal deterrence); John M. Connor &
Robert H. Lande, The Size of Cartel Overcharges: Implications for U.S. and EU Fining Policies,
51 ANTITRUST BULL. 983 (2006) (arguing that EU and U.S. fines are not sufficient to prevent
recidivism).
28. Friedrich A. Hayek, The Origins of the Rule of Law, in THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY
162 (Univ. of Chi. Press 1960); Sandra Day O'Connor, Vindicating the Rule of Law: The Role of
the Judiciary, 2 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 1, 6-7 (2003); J. Harvie Wilkinson HI, Of Guns, Abortions,
and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 VA. L. REv. 253, 264-67 (2009). Perhaps the current state of
the academic literature is best summarized by Mathew D. McCubbins, Daniel B. Rodriguez &
Barry R. Weingast, The Rule of Law Unplugged (Texas Law, Public Law Research Paper No.
154, 2009) (abstract), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1467797 ("The 'Rule of Law' is a
venerable concept, but, on closer inspection, is a complex admixture of positive assumptions,
occasionally wishful thinking, and inchoate political and legal theory.").
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violate rule of law principles. He describes rule of law principles as
those that:
" are "prospective, accessible and clear" to constrain the
government (both the executive and judiciary) from
exercising its power arbitrarily;
" make "it possible to foresee with fair certainty how the
authority will use its coercive powers in given
circumstances and to plan one's individual affairs on the
basis of this knowledge";
* apply to all persons equally, offering equal protection
without prejudicial discrimination; and
" are "of general application and consistent implementation;
[they] should be capable of being obeyed." 29
However one defines these terms, the rule of law seems to be
important to a well functioning antitrust system as it is to a broader legal
system.
Of the set of questions below on substantive antitrust issues, many of
the questions are good in principle but difficult to get enough results in
practice for a survey to be meaningful. Most jurisdictions have few
cases or investigations in many of these substantive areas of law on a
yearly basis. 30
I do not include additional comments for the following questions
because these questions are ones that go to specific types of conduct and
how the antitrust system in a given country resolves them. Some of the
basic behavior for each type of substantive issue might be the same
across jurisdictions based on economic theory. However, some of the
assumptions behind the theory may not hold across countries because of
issues such as the size of the economy, economic concentration,
openness to trade, ease of raising capital, how contract-law enforcement
in a country might implicate antitrust law enforcement, or other issues.
These questions focus on the antitrust agency, but courts implicitly
affect such responses because the agency will choose to bring (or not
29. Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law?, 42 U.C. DAVIS L.
REv. 1375, 1416-19 (2008).
30. See, e.g., ICN, Unilateral Conduct Working Group Questionnaire on Predatory Pricing
and Exclusive Dealing/Single Branding and Responses,
http://intemationalcompetitionnetwork.org/index.php/en/working-groups/unilatera-conduct/
unilateral-conduct-working-group-and-responses-2007 (last visited Mar. 6, 2010); ICN,
Unilateral Conduct Working Group Questionnaire on Tying, Bundled Discounts and Single-
Product Loyalty Discounts and Rebates and Responses, http://intemationalcompetitionnetwork
.org/index.php/en/working-groups/unilateral-conduct/
questionnaire (last visited March 6, 2010).
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bring) certain cases based on how courts react to such cases. Agencies
also may frame cases in one way rather than another because of
potential success with courts.3
1
10. How do you rate the quality of agency action in cases involving
joint ventures?
11. How do you rate the quality of agency action in cases involving
bundling?
12. How do you rate the quality of agency action in cases involving
tying?
13. How do you rate the quality of agency action in cases involving
exclusive dealing?
14. How do you rate the quality of agency action in cases involving
refusals to deal?
15. How do you rate the quality of agency action in cases involving
resale price maintenance?
16. How do you rate the quality of agency action in cases involving
predatory behavior?
17. How do you rate the quality of agency action in cases involving
price discrimination?
III. DOES THE RESTAURANT ANALOGY WORK IN AN ANTITRUST
CONTEXT?
Measuring quality is highly subjective. In this sense, the problem is
that "local" in antitrust is not geographic (e.g., I do not like Chicago-
style pizza) but rather an economic philosophy (I do not think that most
vertical restraints are problematic). Thus, for many, what is high quality
may be determined by what they think an agency should do.
One broad measurement of the quality of the substantive enforcement
issues is whether the agency has a clear sense of the goal(s) that it sees
for competition law-whether or not we agree with the goal(s)-and
consistently and rationally applies the law to achieve the goal(s).
Another measurement of quality might mean well-reasoned decision-
31. Mark A. Lemley & Christopher R. Leslie, Categorical Analysis in Antitrust
Jurisprudence, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1207, 1211-12 (2007).
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making based upon an error-cost framework. The appeal of a survey is
that it allows us to utilize the wisdom of a large group to reach a
socially efficient way to determine what constitutes "quality." 32
Some of the restaurant parallel weakens because the restaurant must
satisfy customers in order to survive, whereas the agency has a
completely different constituency as far as its budget. Moreover,
different people involved in the restaurant dynamic have different
expectations for the restaurant. Antitrust enforcers have different goals
than do private lawyers. The enforcers want to serve the public interest
(even if they also have a public choice agenda as well), whereas private
lawyers represent their clients. Maybe they each have different sets of
assumptions and expectations of what should be on the menu.
What purpose would such a ranking serve? Unlike restaurant
customers, there are not reduced search costs from a ratings guide for
agencies. Lawyers and businesses cannot take a pass on an agency with
only one star. In most cases, they are stuck eating the lousy food and
putting up with the lousy service that a bad antitrust agency provides. 33
Cross-country comparisons of antitrust agencies may not be
measuring the same type of restaurant. Restaurants in some countries
face different constraints such as the availability of good steak or
seafood. Significant political and economic differences across countries
shape the contours of antitrust within that country. Different countries'
competition authorities face different challenges. The economic
organization of the country may be such that there are few or many
state-owned enterprises. 34  For others, the nature of industrial
organization in the country (factors such as trade openness and
concentration) will shape the resource allocation within an antitrust
agency. For some agencies, dealing with state aid and abuse of
dominant position may be more probative and afforded greater weight
32. JAMES SUROWiECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS: WHY THE MANY ARE SMARTER THAN
THE FEW AND How COLLECTIVE WISDOM SHAPES BUSINESS, ECONOMIES, SOCIETIES, AND
NATIONS (2004) (explaining that collective knowledge may be better than individual knowledge).
33. This, of course, is not totally correct. Firms can potentially find a new country to do
business in and there can be some sort of global Tiebout choice regarding policy preferences.
Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956)
(providing a theoretical model of how mobile consumer voters shape the level of public goods a
locality provides). For global firms that need to be in all (at least major) jurisdictions, there is no
ability to exit the market. ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO
DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970) (explaining the choices of voice and
exit).
34. Eleanor M. Fox, An Anti-Monopoly Law for China-Scaling the Walls of Government
Restraints, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 173, 173 (2008); D. Daniel Sokol, Competition Policy and
Comparative Corporate Governance of State Owned Enterprises, 2009 BYU L. REV. 1713
(2009).
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than some other antitrust issues.
In contrast to subjective standards of a survey, are there any objective
metrics to baseline (and compare) the agencies' performance? There
might be some metrics which may cut across all agencies. Objective
metrics could supplement some of the subjective metrics of antitrust the
way Zagat's can baseline restaurants on price or the number of entr6es.
Some cross-country quantitative measurements exist. Whether they
measure the right things is another question. The World Economic
Forum provides a score in its annual Global Competitiveness Report
based on the overall perception of a country's antitrust effectiveness. 35
This is not a broad survey and a high overall score may still mask
significant flaws on particular issues. The survey uses both publicly
available data and survey data of a group of worldwide business leaders.
Some antitrust articles have used these sets of scores as a proxy of
agency effectiveness. 36
Additional objective measures could include the length of time to
conduct merger review or prosecute a price-fixing suit. It might include
the level of fines collected or the ratio of agency budget to the number
of attorneys of the staff. These and other "objective" measurements are
actually highly subjective. A short length of time for cases could mean
that an agency is working expeditiously. However, it could also mean
that an agency looks for cheap wins and is prone to settle on terms that
are not optimal because of a lack of resources to try cases or lack of
confidence in winning difficult cases before the courts. The level of
fines may seem low but given the size of the economy and of firms in
that country, maybe the fines collected are properly calibrated. In other
circumstances, if one measures success by the level of fines, it may lead
to excessive fines.
One could measure the budget-to-staff ratio of an agency to try to
determine a measurement of "bang for the buck." A budget-to-staff
ratio provides a measure of resources used per person. However, some
agencies have larger administrative staff than others. 37 Other agencies
need more economists than lawyers because of the type of cases that the
35. WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, THE GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2009-2010 (2009),
available at http://www.weforum.org/pdf/GCR09/GCR20092010fullreport.pdf.
36. Keith N. Hylton & Fei Deng, Antitrust Around the World: An Empirical Analysis of the
Scope of Competition Laws and Their Effects, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 271 (2007); Michael W.
Nicholson, An Antitrust Law Index for Empirical Analysis of International Competition Policy, 4
J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 1009 (2008).
37. D. Daniel Sokol, The Development of Human Capital in Latin American Competition
Policy, in COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA 15 (Eleanor M. Fox and D. Daniel
Sokol eds., 2009).
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agency brings. In yet other agencies the size of the staff is not a clear
picture of "bang for the buck" because a staff member may have
multiple tasks. The staffer may have some antitrust and some non-
antitrust functions like consumer protection or intellectual property
enforcement.
The age of the agency might matter because the older the agency, the
better the institutional knowledge. It is possible to quantify the age of
an agency based on when the antitrust law went into effect. Is such a
measurement actually useful? It is not clear that it is. It assumes
institutional knowledge grows over time and that age might be an
indirect proxy for an upward learning curve of an agency. However,
particularly in developing-world antitrust agencies, turnover is high. In
some countries the agency might lose twenty-five percent of its staff per
year. This attrition may be a function of the success of an
agency-because of the expertise developed, staffers have many
opportunities in the private sector at salaries much greater than what
they were making while working for the government. 38
Does the number of decisions an agency undertakes matter because it
speaks to activity? If so, this has the potential to bias the ranking to
favor those agencies that prosecute many cases. This may lead to over-
enforcement or to a focus on the wrong sort of enforcement-little cases
that do not matter as opposed to large ones that have a bigger impact on
conduct and the shape of antitrust doctrine. Case counts are a highly
political measure. A subjective qualitative measure may be less
political because it captures the sense of what people think about the
quality, not quantity, of enforcement.
IV. CONCLUSION
Even with its flaws, there are reasons to think that agencies would be
responsive to a restaurant guide-style rating. One benefit of Zagat's is
that the information helps rivals benchmark their performance against
comparables, thereby improving quality of food or service. Pride and
self-respect will motivate agencies to improve.39 Benchmarking allows
38. William E. Kovacic, Institutional Foundations for Economic Legal Reform in Transition
Economies: The Case of Competition Policy and Antitrust Enforcement, 77 CH.-KENT L. REV.
265, 283 (2001).
39. D. Daniel Sokol, Monopolists Without Borders: The Institutional Challenge of
International Antitrust in a Global Gilded Age, 4 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 37, 98-99 (2007)
[hereinafter Sokol, Monopolists Without Borders]. That is exactly what seems to happen with
health-care report cards. No one went to medical school to be below-average. There are strong
professional norms of excellence that motivate improved performance if there is a feedback loop.
David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, The Poor State of Health Care Quality in the U.S.: Is
Malpractice Liability Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution?, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 893,
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
younger antitrust agencies to see the level of practice of more mature
institutions in implementing antitrust law.40 External to the agency, the
ratings may affect other parts of government. Good or bad ratings may
prompt action from the governmental body that has antitrust oversight.
The quality of the review may change the level of funding for the
agency or may be a factor in a change in agency leadership.4 1
Antitrust agency leadership across countries, fonts of wisdom though
they may be, have blinders to their own weaknesses. We know what
agencies say at conferences and in their annual reports. 42 Most of what
they do is to highlight the positive developments. What we do not
know is what really happens in those agencies. A "customer" survey of
the quality of the agency provides feedback to the agency of a broader
group that might highlight a different set of issues.
I do not, alas, have a great solution. An imperfect ratings system may
be better than no ratings at all. Agencies may not realize how bad they
are doing comparatively or in an absolute sense. Most people seem to
think they are above average in looks. Of course, fifty percent of such
people are wrong in their views. With an assessment of the antitrust
system and a poor showing, an agency may rethink its goals and the
tools at its disposal. The benefit of a ranking of agencies is that it
creates a vehicle to begin the process of agency self-assessment.43
Three issues in particular require greater depth and analysis in future
work. First, it is important to identify the reasons for reviewing
antitrust and the process to go about such a review. Second, the theories
needed to be tested with real world cases and results evaluated. Third,
methodologies need to be reevaluated in light of the results.
Let the ratings begin! 44
940-41 (2004).
40. Mariana Bode & Oliver Budzinski, Competing Ways Towards International Antitrust: The
WTO Versus the ICN (Marburg Papers on Econ., Working Paper No. 03-2005, 2005), available at
http://ssrn.comlabstract=888682.
41. Sokol, Monopolists Without Borders, supra note 39, at 98-99.
42. See, e.g., OECD, Resale Price Maintenance, OECD Doc. DAF/COMP (2008)37 (Sept. 10,
2009), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/39/63/43835526.pdf; John Fingleton, Chief
Executive, Office of Fair Trade, Closing Speech to the ICN Conference (Jun. 5, 2009), available
at http://www.intemationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/library/ICNclosingspeech.pdf.
43. Joyce Ehrlinger & David Dunning, How Chronic Self-Views Influence (and Potentially
Mislead) Estimates of Performance, 84 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 6-7, 13-15 (2003).
44. Maybe you were expecting "Let them eat cake!" instead?
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